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Absolutely Uncontrollable Weapons
I. Introduction
In the nuclear age, people have lived with the risk of devastating nuclear 
explosions and radioactive emergencies. These risks range from nuclear war 
resulting from the failure of nuclear deterrence, accidental nuclear war, to 
attacks on nuclear power plants. This paper analyzes the uncontrollability of 
these risks and the inadequate political commitment to defuse them. Finally, this 
paper examines the necessity of reframing our arguments on nuclear issues in 
humanitarian terms that confront the inhumane and even unlawful nuclear risks.
II. Absolute Weapons with Deficiency
In August 1945, when the U.S. dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, we had a demonstration of the catastrophic devastation that nuclear 
weapons can wreak. A book edited by Bernard Brodie called this weapon “the 
absolute weapon” (Brodie, 1946). However, the various risks inherent in nuclear 
weapons have threatened states, international communities and peoples for 
decades.
1. Risk 1: Unproven Nuclear Deterrence Theory
Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union deployed nuclear weapons on a vast, 
“overkill” scale. The core logic of their military strategy was one of deterrence 
based on the threat of nuclear retaliation. However, with the passage of time, 
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“the international community gradually becomes aware of the inherent 
contradiction that the destructive power of nuclear weapons is too ruinous to be 
of practical use” (Ogawa, 2002).
The effectiveness of nuclear deterrence is theoretical; it has yet to be proven, 
as David Krieger argues below.
A theory may posit a causal relationship, for example, if one party does 
something, certain results will follow. In the case of nuclear deterrence 
theory, it is posited that if one party threatens to retaliate with nuclear 
weapons, the other side will not attack. That an attack has not occurred, 
however, does not prove that it was prevented by nuclear deterrence. That 
is, in logic, a false assumption of causality. (Krieger, 2011)
Nevertheless, government officials and experts in the nuclear deterrence 
camp maintain the idea of how successfully nuclear deterrence between the U.S. 
and the Soviet Union has worked. However, in reality, the balance of nuclear 
terror “nearly tipped into nuclear war in the case of Berlin and the Cuban Missile 
Crisis” (Sokolski, 2012).
Many proponents of nuclear deterrence often use the Cuban Missile Crisis 
as the most successful example of nuclear deterrence, suggesting that a 
devastating nuclear exchange was prevented because of mutual deterrence. On 
the other hand, policy makers who were involved in this serious crisis had a 
different viewpoint.
Robert McNamara, the U.S. Secretary of Defense at the time of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, was one of them. He emphasized that “at the end we lucked out. 
It was luck that prevented nuclear war. We came that close to nuclear war at the 
end. Rational individuals: Kennedy was rational; Khrushchev was rational; 
Castro was rational. Rational individuals came that close to total destruction of 
their societies. And that danger exists today.” Furthermore, he added, “(t)he 
major lesson of the Cuban missile crisis is this: the indefinite combination of 
human fallibility and nuclear weapons will destroy nations” (McNamara, 2007).
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Thus, nuclear deterrence is unproven, and great risks of uncontrollability are 
built into the nuclear weapons system. Why, then, do we still talk about nuclear 
deterrence? One reason is that many people are not sure that the world is safe 
enough without nuclear deterrence. However, the most important explanation is 
that nuclear deterrence is used as “a justification for possessing nuclear 
weapons” (Wilson, 2008).
2. Risk 2: Accidental and Unintentional Nuclear War
Although enthusiasm for nuclear deterrence continues, the risk of accidental 
and unintentional nuclear war has had a low profile. However, Bruce Blair, a 
former USAF nuclear missile launch site officer, has warned over and over again 
of this risk.
According to Blair, the nuclear war machinery on both the American and 
Russian sides is on a hair trigger. These two nuclear rivals still “stand ready to 
inflict apocalyptic devastation on one another in a first or second strike whose 
essential course would be run in less than one hour.” This on-alert nuclear 
posture has been maintained for decades, even after the end of the Cold War. 
Because the decision to launch a nuclear missile has to be made and 
implemented quickly, before missiles launched by the other side can arrive, the 
response procedure is preplanned in detail. It can reasonably be described as 
“going to war by checklist, enacting a prepared script, with little margin for 
human error or technical malfunction” (Blair, 2008).
This quick-reaction system is vulnerable to a mistaken or unauthorized 
nuclear launch command, ranging from a single nuclear missile to the launch of 
a massive salvo because of a false warning (Forrow et al., 1998). Scott Sagan 
(1993) listed past incidents that increased the risk of mistaken missile launch. 
One of them took place 18 years ago, six years after the end of the Cold War.
The Russian early warning radar detected an unexpected missile launch on 
January 25, 1995. The estimated flight time to Moscow was only five minutes. 
The Russian nuclear war machine started its launch procedure, and their early 
warning and control and command center switched to combat mode. Fortunately, 
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within five minutes, Russian radar had confirmed that the missile would land 
outside Russia’s borders, and launch preparations were canceled. Sometime 
later, Russia determined that the missile was Norwegian, and it was launched for 
scientific research. In fact, on January 16, Norway had notified 35 countries, 
including Russia, that the launch was planned. This notice had apparently 
reached the Russian Defense Ministry, but it did not reach the on-duty personnel 
of the early warning system (Blair, Feiveson & von Hippel, 1997).
How close have we come to nuclear war over the course of the past 
incidents listed? There is no clear answer to this question, but, “the accumulation 
of small probabilities of disaster from a long sequence of risks adds up to serious 
danger” (Philips, online). These small probabilities of disaster suggest that 
nuclear weapons are not securely controlled.
3. Risk 3: Global Disaster by Regional War
President Obama (2009) said that “the threat of global nuclear war has gone 
down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up.” One of the most serious 
concerns is a regional nuclear exchange. Polly Holdorf (2011) summarized 
today’s risk of regional nuclear war as follows.
• The concept of limited nuclear war originated in the bipolar security 
environment of the Cold War, as a potential alternative to a full-scale 
nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union.
• In a multipolar global society populated by a growing number of nuclear 
states, it is becoming increasingly important to consider the possibility of 
the use of one or more nuclear weapons during a conflict between regional 
adversaries.
A true global nuclear war is far more dangerous, but even a limited or 
regional nuclear war would be disastrous. In the traditional sense, the attacks on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki constituted limited nuclear war. Needless to say, these 
two limited nuclear attacks were completely inhumane. Therefore, the fact that 
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“the threat of global nuclear war has gone down” is very positive news, but the 
negative reality of the post-Cold War age is that “the risk of a nuclear attack has 
gone up.”
What is worse, a limited or regional nuclear war could still trigger global 
environmental catastrophe. There have been strong arguments that global 
nuclear war could lead to a “nuclear winter” that would threaten all life on the 
planet. Recent studies by climate scientists, however, have demonstrated that 
“even a small exchange of nuclear weapons —between 50 and 100 Hiroshima-
sized bombs, which India and Pakistan already have their in arsenal — would 
produce enough soot and smoke to block out sunlight, cool the planet, and 
produce climate change unprecedented in recorded human history.” On top of 
this risk, research by the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) 
suggests that a regional nuclear war “would also burn a hole through the ozone 
layer, allowing extreme levels of ultraviolet radiation to reach the Earth’s 
surface, which would greatly damage agriculture and most likely lead to a global 
nuclear famine” (Harrell, 2011).
If larger cities were targeted by nuclear weapons, more soot and smoke 
would be produced. Therefore, a group of scientists warns that “(t)he 
combination of nuclear proliferation, political instability, and urban 
demographics may constitute one of the greatest dangers to the stability of 
society since the dawn of humans” (Toon et al., 2007).
We cannot have a real experiment on this planet to test whether these 
hypotheses are correct. Accordingly, we are trapped in a situation in which these 
risks are beyond our ability to manage with confidence.
III. Civilian Nuclear Uses with Catastrophic Risks
1. Risk 4: Power –Weapons Crossover
The probability of nuclear catastrophe will increase if nuclear proliferation 
is accelerated by the spread of civilian uses of nuclear energy.
The energy source of both nuclear weapons and nuclear power plants is the 
fission of uranium or plutonium atoms, a process that releases huge amounts of 
36
energy. Therefore, the materials, technologies, facilities and human resources 
associated with the civilian use of nuclear energy can be co-opted for military 
use.
This tight connection between nuclear power and nuclear weapons is called 
the power –weapons crossover. This power –weapons crossover is “seriously 
underplayed and often ignored in discussions about the so-called ‘need’ for 
nuclear power to help meet energy demand while addressing global warming 
concerns” (Ackland, 2009).
The fundamental document of the global agreement that bars nuclear 
proliferation and promotes civilian nuclear energy use is the Non Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT), which was enacted in 1970. The NPT contains a set of obligations 
that nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) have 
undertaken to ensure the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and movement 
toward a nuclear-weapon-free world, often referred to as the “Grand Bargain” 
(Weiss, 2003). The agreement obligates the NWS to initiate negotiations on 
nuclear disarmament (Article VI) and not to assist efforts by the NNWS to 
obtain nuclear weapons (Article I). The NPT also requires the NNWS to forgo 
the acquisition of nuclear weapons (Article II) and to place all of their nuclear 
facilities under international safeguards (Article III). In addition, the NPT 
recognizes the “inalienable right” to research, develop, produce and use nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes (Article IV).
2. Risk 5: Loopholes in the NPT
In the real world of politics, several states already have exploited Article IV 
to advance their dubious nuclear weapons programs and to threaten international 
security. Iraq and Libya attempted to establish uranium enrichment programs 
without international safeguards. North Korea acquired a spent fuel reprocessing 
facility in the name of peaceful purposes, but they used it to acquire plutonium 
for nuclear explosive devices. Iran is still expanding its uranium enrichment 
program without accepting the full scope of international safeguards, including 
the Additional Protocol. If we leave loopholes in the NPT and allow such abuses 
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of Article IV to continue, “the net-value of peaceful nuclear cooperation will 
diminish, and the security benefits derived from the NPT will erode” (Sanders, 
2004).
How should we think about risks embedded in this nuclear power–weapons 
crossover? Business as usual cannot be the answer. Realist recommendations 
were provided in the Futures Roundtable report by the Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory in the U.S. The experts who participated in this round table 
shared certain understandings, such as: (a) security concerns will continue to 
play a central role in the debate over the nuclear future; (b) the existing 
nonproliferation regime must be enhanced, particularly enforcement; and (c) 
tighter control of nuclear material is required, followed by minimization of 
surplus material. The participants concluded that to achieve a clear vision for the 
future of nuclear technology, “something on the scale of the 1953 Eisenhower 
speech” would be necessary (Lehman II, 2004).
In 1953 President Eisenhower gave a speech at the UN General Assembly 
(UNGA), the key elements of which were the promotion of both nuclear 
disarmament and civilian nuclear energy, and the international control of nuclear 
fissile materials. So, when we consider a vision on the scale of this speech, we 
need to explore international control of these materials for the purpose of 
enhancing and enforcing the NPT.
However, from an empirical point of view, it is highly unlikely that the 
international community will reach a consensus on an international or 
multilateral system to control nuclear fissile materials safely and securely.
The NWS and many of their allies hope to contain “cheaters” —states that 
are parties to the NPT but who either secretly or openly mount nuclear weapons 
programs. Although this approach is based upon reasonable concerns, “less 
attention has been paid to the failures of the NWS to meet their commitments 
under the NPT” (Weiss, 2013). As described previously, if the NWS want the 
NNWS to accept new international obligations, then the first thing that they 
should do is to become more serious about nuclear disarmament negotiations. 
Without this component of the “Grand Bargain”, many NNWS will regard the 
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introduction of new international obligations as unfair and perhaps even a 
violation of their inalienable rights manifested in Article IV.
Therefore, the NPT will probably remain an incomplete regime with 
loopholes. If this (somewhat pessimistic) outcome occurs, nuclear proliferation 
will continue, and the risk of a nuclear war or confrontation will increase 
exponentially.
3. Risk 6: Weaponization of Nuclear Facilities
Even if not converted to military use, civilian nuclear energy facilities still 
are a potential risk to peaceful society. An attack on nuclear facilities by 
terrorists or during war can cause a serious radioactive emergency.
Currently, there are 440 nuclear reactors in operation worldwide. Sixty more 
are planned, and many of them are in developing countries. What would happen 
if nuclear facilities were attacked? Many American and European experts shared 
a heightened concern for the terrorist targeting of nuclear power plants following 
the Fukushima accident. It is a nightmarish scenario that combines “9/11” (the 
collapse of the World Trade Center) and “3/11” (the Fukushima accident).
A joint study by U.S. and Russian experts on the threat of nuclear terrorism 
concluded that “(o)ne important lesson of the Chernobyl and Fukushima 
accidents is that what can happen as a result of an accident can also happen as a 
result of a premeditated action.” The report goes on to say that “(i)ndeed, today’s 
high levels of nuclear safety are dependent on the high reliability of components 
such as cooling systems; if these are intentionally destroyed, the probability of a 
large release would increase greatly” (Bunn et al., 2011).
The risk imposed by possible military attacks on nuclear facilities has been 
a matter of concern for many years. An analytical report issued by the Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution (1976) presented some serious 
thoughts about the effects of a military attack on nuclear installations.
In the case of nuclear war, radioactive contamination would be just a part of 
a general catastrophe. However, at the same time, we need to take into 
consideration that “an attack with conventional weapons leading to the release 
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of radioactivity would produce some of the effects of nuclear weapons.” As 
conventional war “could be magnified by attack on nuclear installations”, this 
risk should definitely be “a major factor to consider when deciding whether, or 
to what extent, to use nuclear power.”
What would be the military rationale for a conventional attack on nuclear 
facilities? One motivation might be to cripple the enemy’s energy sources, 
including nuclear power plants. A second motivation might be to impede 
postwar recovery by seriously damaging the environment. Military attacks on 
nuclear facilities would have significant implications for international stability, 
as the released radioactive products could easily cross national borders. 
Nevertheless, military planners are “likely to contemplate the destruction of 
atomic installations, including nuclear fuel fabrication, power, spent fuel, 
reprocessing, and waste storage facilities” (Ramberg, 1980).
As in the case of nuclear war, we have no crystal ball to tell us what would 
happen in an attack on a nuclear facility. Despite this uncertainty, because of the 
possible magnitude of radioactive contamination in such an attack, we must 
regard nuclear facilities as potential enemy weapons that are beyond our control.
IV. Ethical Responses of the International Community
What ethical responses can we make to the risks of nuclear weapons and the 
weaponization of nuclear facilities? Ethical responses can be examined through 
multiple prisms, but this article focuses on multinational legal approaches that 
support humanitarian principles.
1. Humanitarian Law
International humanitarian laws, which have been evolving since the 
nineteenth century, lay out basic principles and rules for weapons of war, 
including prohibiting or restricting the use of certain weapons. Additionally, 
some international humanitarian laws prohibit military attack on certain targets, 
such as nuclear facilities.
These basic principles, which apply in all armed conflicts, oblige state 
40
parties in a conflict (i.e., the warring parties, whether states or non-state armed 
groups) to target only military objectives and not the civilian population, 
individual civilians or civilian objects (e.g., homes, schools, and hospitals). 
Failure to make this distinction in military operations is a war crime (Fujita, 
1988).
Of course, for nuclear weapons, the following question comes to mind: Can 
the use of nuclear weapons, which have such horrific effects on humans and the 
environment, be compatible with human conscience and with international 
humanitarian laws? In fact, there is no international humanitarian law that 
specifically prohibits the use of nuclear weapons or threats to use nuclear 
weapons.
2. The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice
Having deep concern for the above legal situation, the UNGA and the World 
Health Organization (WHO) requested an Advisory Opinion by the ICJ 
(International Court of Justice). The ICJ replied that the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable 
in armed conflict, and in particular, it would violate the principles and rules of 
humanitarian law. However, given current international laws, the ICJ avoided 
definitively answering whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be 
lawful in extreme self-defense circumstances, such as when the very survival of 
a state was at stake (ICJ, 1996).
This Advisory Opinion represented one step forward, as it established a 
standard by which the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be 
contrary to the rules of international law. However, it was less than what 
humanitarians had hoped for, because it acknowledged that the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons could be lawful and justified in extreme cases.
3. A Model Nuclear Weapons Convention
Inspired by the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion, lawyers, doctors, scientists and 
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other groups met repeatedly over a period of several months. The product of this 
exercise was released as the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC). The 
provisions of the NWC prohibit the development, testing, production, 
stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons. It also outlines 
five phases in the elimination of nuclear weapons, starting with reducing the 
high-alert status of nuclear weapons, which includes removing nuclear warheads 
from their delivery vehicles (NWC provisions, 1997).
At the request of Costa Rica, in April 1997, the NWC was accepted as 
official UN Document A/C.1/52/7. In the Final Document of the 2010 NPT 
Review Conference, the state parties took note of the proposal of the U.N. 
Secretary General to consider starting negotiations on this NWC. This was the 
first time that an NPT Review Conference final document referred to 
international law that prohibits nuclear weapons.
The mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki endorsed the NWC and actively 
joined international campaigns to make it a reality. For example, the two mayors 
sent a letter to the Prime Minister of Japan and urged work toward early 
realization of the NWC. The letter stated that, in the international community, 
“there is an accelerating drive to outlaw nuclear weapons, highlighting their 
inhumane nature.”
These efforts from the humanitarian side, such as the request for the ICJ 
Advisory Opinion and the endorsement of the NWC, highlight the inherent 
ethical problems of nuclear weapons. Capturing this new trend in the 
international community, in March 2013, the Norwegian government hosted an 
international Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons.
The conference concluded by recognizing that (a) the current discourse on 
nuclear weapons has been insufficient to address the grave threats that they pose 
to human existence, and (b) the challenge posed by nuclear weapons to human 
and planetary survival must be addressed through preventative measures (The 
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, 2013). This conference 
was the first time that many governments have gathered to address the 
humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. Mexico announced that it will host a 
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follow-up meeting.
4. Less Attention to the Weaponization of Nuclear Facilities
This series of political engagements in the last two decades strongly reflects 
the deep concerns that many states and peoples have about the inherent risks of 
nuclear weapons. These political engagements provoked and encouraged a 
significant change in perspective for many NNWS and peoples vis-à-vis the 
nuclear age.
In marked contrast, far less attention has been paid to the dangers of 
weaponized nuclear facilities. Of course, some positive and notable attempts 
have been made. For example, in the Additional Protocol (1997) to the 1949 
Geneva Convention, attempts were made to apply humanitarian principles to the 
military necessity to attack nuclear facilities. Article 56 (Protection of works and 
Installations Containing Dangerous Forces) prohibits attacks on dams, dykes 
and nuclear electrical generating stations “if such attack may cause the release 
of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population” 
(Additional Protocol of 1997). This was a step forward from an ethical point of 
view, but there is still ambiguity.
As written above, an attack on a nuclear facility would be unlawful if it 
inflicted severe losses on the civilian population. However, it is not clear what 
“severe losses” means. Even if a radioactive release were serious in terms of 
public health, the cancer consequences of irradiation may take years to manifest. 
Meanwhile, the attacker can proclaim that severe losses have not been proved. 
Furthermore, because of this ambiguity, Article 56 could conceivably be used to 
justify an attack on a nuclear power station.
Resolution 533 of the IAEA (1990) is part of the international legal 
framework governing the security of civilian nuclear energy. The title of 
Resolution 533 is “Prohibition of All Armed Attacks against Nuclear 
Installations Devoted to Peaceful Purposes Whether under Construction or in 
Operation.” This resolution recognizes that “an armed attack or a threat of armed 
attack on a safeguarded nuclear facility, in operation or under construction, 
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would create a situation in which the United Nations Security Council would 
have to act immediately in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations 
Charter.”
However, this does not mean that such attacks are automatically judged as 
unlawful, because the UN Security Council may not necessarily take action. 
Proponents of Resolution 533 appealed to the Conference on Disarmament in 
Geneva to overcome their differences and to reach a treaty to ban such attacks, 
but there has been no visible progress.
The main reason why a treaty to ban attacks on nuclear facilities has not 
been passed is that certain countries do not want to abandon the option to target 
nuclear facilities. Actually, the U.S. destroyed Iraqi nuclear facilities during the 
Gulf War in 1991, and Israel’s air force destroyed a suspected nuclear reactor 
under construction in Syria in 2007. These cases did not immediately cause 
severe losses among civilian populations, and the UN Security Council did not 
take any official actions, such as imposing sanctions.
5. Nuclear Terrorism Convention
As the most recent ethical response, the International Convention for the 
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (Nuclear Terrorism Convention) 
should be mentioned. This Convention was adopted by the UNGA in April 2005. 
It details offenses associated with the unlawful and intentional possession and 
use of radioactive material or a radioactive device, and the use or damage of 
nuclear facilities. However, so far, fewer than half of the UN member states 
have ratified the Convention, in part because many developing countries still 
have difficulties with their legal and justice systems because of a lack of human 
and financial resources.
In sum, unfortunately, legal restraints remain fairly weak in preventing 
attacks on nuclear facilities. Although the Fukushima accident demonstrated a 
new type of radioactive threat by state or nonstate actors, the international 
community failed to address the danger and inhumanity of weaponized nuclear 
facilities. Subsequently, Ramberg (1990)’s conclusion is still valid. He describes 
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a reality as follows: “(t)he temptation of wartime threats or actions against 
nuclear energy facilities in many regions of the world adds a significant 
dimension to the problem of maintaining international peace and minimizing the 
consequence of war. These conclusions suggest that the vulnerability of nuclear 
energy facilities to military actions should be included in nuclear energy risk 
calculations.”
V. Ethical Empowerment
To satisfy a global demand to secure the international community against 
nuclear risks, ethical power supplied by transnational civil society is desperately 
wanted. The bottom line is that civil empowerment on a global scale, based on 
humanitarian principles, will be a driving force in making a difference in 
conventional political discourse.
1. Political Reality
Given the various kinds of risks posed by both military and civilian nuclear 
energy, why on earth have we failed to minimize or eliminate these risks?
On the military side, it is largely because nuclear deterrence has been 
adopted as a core component of national and international defense strategies, 
despite the risks and deficiencies of this approach (as described in previous 
paragraphs). It is also true that we have yet to devise practical security 
frameworks and international regimes as alternatives to nuclear deterrence.
On the civilian side, many countries consider nuclear energy to be helpful in 
meeting their energy requirements without contributing to global warming. On 
the other hand, postnuclear countries, such as Germany, have decided to shift 
away from nuclear power generation. In Japan, there have been active political 
and public debates following the Fukushima accident, and the ruling Liberal 
Democratic Party was the only opponent to phasing out nuclear power among 
the nine major political parties in the Upper House election campaigns in July 
2013.
However, in general, the international community has not fully explored 
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ways and means to minimize the potential uncontrollability of radioactive risks. 
Indeed, relatively little political attention has been paid to the risks associated 
with the civilian use of nuclear energy.
2. An Inadequate Ethical Response
On many occasions, political leaders have pledged their efforts to carry out 
their ethical responsibility to deal with nuclear risks. They have often included 
critical appraisals of the various risks inherent in nuclear weaponry and nuclear 
power generation systems. However, political leaders are often better with words 
than with deeds.
Of course, they should be responsible for the gap between their words and 
deeds, as well as for their inaction. Having said that, as is often the case in 
politics, political leaders will not commit themselves to difficult tasks unless 
strong public interest and support prevail.
In democratic societies, we the people decide how to deal with significant 
issues such as nuclear risks. It is not just political leaders who have political 
responsibilities; ordinary citizens do too. Accordingly, we the people, as the 
beneficiaries of security by nuclear deterrence and consumers of electricity 
generated by nuclear power, are coresponsible for the fact that we still live with 
these dangers. In democratic countries, civil society consists of people who have 
the power to shift policies by changing political leaders or ruling parties through 
elections and other democratic tools. Did we fully exercise our civil rights with 
an ethical sense of the humanitarian emergency? Apparently, not enough.
In the last two decades, we have observed some success stories by civil 
society. In obtaining the ICJ advisory opinion, the “World Court Project (WCP)” 
of the transnational civil movement played a magnificent role. NGOs such as the 
Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy (LCNP), the International Association 
of Lawyers Against nuclear Arms (IALANA), the International Peace Bureau 
(IPB) and the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War 
(IPPNW) led the WCPs and the worldwide campaign that resulted in the historic 
advisory opinion.
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Civil society provided strong support to the Norwegian organizers of the 
first International Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons 
in 2013. Prior to the governmental conference, an NGO called the International 
Campaign to Ban Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) convened a series of events in and 
around this conference and provided much inspiring input to the governmental 
conference.
However, more success stories are needed in the face of the great nuclear 
dangers. Actions taken by civil society have not been enough to end our reliance 
on nuclear energy in both military and civilian use.
Dryzek (2006) uses the term “reflexive modernization” to explain the 
activism of today’s civil society. He argues that “(r)eflexive modernization 
means that ever-increasing numbers of actors are capable of influencing their 
social relationships rather than simply accepting them. The basic idea of 
reflexive modernization is that individuals are increasingly unwilling to take for 
granted the tradition in which they have been socialized, or to accept risks 
imposed upon them as inevitable accomplishments as progress.” Definitely, 
more reflexive modernization in globalized civil society should be welcomed 
and extended in the effort to tackle nuclear risks.
3. Conclusion: Democratic Peace Beyond Geography and 
Generation
To hold political leaders accountable to their words, civil society needs to 
put a higher priority on policies necessary to deal with the humanitarian 
emergency posed by nuclear risks. We must demand that political leaders 
commit themselves to immediately minimizing those risks and eventually 
eliminating them.
On the military front, this is not only a matter for the NWS but also an issue 
for the NNWS and, in particular, states such as Japan that live under a “nuclear 
umbrella” (extended nuclear deterrence) provided by the NWS. On the civilian 
front, stakeholders include all of the nuclear and postnuclear countries and their 
societies.
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Taking into account what we have done and not done, we must articulate 
and pursue risk-reduction measures on a global scale —that is, we must act 
beyond national borders. With respect to such actions, Chumakov’s (1998) 
perspective on the role of civil society and humanism is insightful.
At the dawn of global civil society, the test for humanity is to achieve unity 
while preserving cultural differences as well as the distinctiveness of nations 
and peoples. Such unity can be reached only by recognizing human values, 
especially human rights.
Furthermore, in the same context, Chumakov emphasizes the need to 
“develop foundations and principles for a world society and to formulate a 
global consciousness and a humanistic worldview that adequately reflects the 
realities of our epoch.” He maintains that our action must increasingly be based 
on an acknowledgment of global human values.
If we acknowledge global human values, we can see from the footprints that 
we have left behind that we have not adequately responded to the risks posed by 
military and civilian nuclear energy. Our footprints reflect the conventional 
pattern of our priorities: political realism first, and human ethics second. This 
kind of “ethical deficit” in our political choices is counterproductive to our 
efforts to reduce nuclear risks. What we need is a democratic risk-reduction 
process —a way to get beyond geography and generation through global civil 
empowerment.
To change this “ethical deficit” to an “ethical surplus”, we desperately need 
to reframe our arguments on nuclear issues in humanitarian terms and to initiate 
swift civil actions in coordination with like-minded states that support the 
abolition of nuclear weapons and the weaponization of nuclear facilities. Thus, 
we have to make it a global norm immediately to reduce, and ultimately to 
eliminate, nuclear risks.
A book edited by Brodie in 1946 said that “(i)t is not only sovereign states 
but individual attitudes which must undergo transformation” in the nuclear age, 
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and although “(a)bsolute freedom from the fear of the absolute weapon may not 
be for our time … let us, with intelligence, determination, persistence, and good 
will, get on with the task of meeting this new threat.”
Shall uncontrollable weapons, including weaponized nuclear facilities, 
destroy us or shall we destroy them? The answer depends on us not them.
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<Summary>
Fumihiko Yoshida 
To analyze “Ethics and Peace and Nuclear Weapons,” a critical appraisal of 
the various risks inherent in nuclear weapons systems is indispensable. The logic 
of deterrence, that nuclear weapons as absolute weapons can maintain peace and 
stability, has been heard for decades. Whatever rationale this logic may have 
had, it has become less credible. Moreover, the unnecessary high-alert status of 
nuclear weapons remains, posing the risk of accidental or unintentional nuclear 
war. In addition, concerns for proliferation increase as some key technologies 
and fissile materials can be used for both civilian and military purposes. Even 
limited or regional nuclear war resulting from proliferation would be disastrous 
to large populations and the global environment. When considering nuclear 
risks, the weaponization of nuclear facilities such as power plants should be 
addressed. Weaponization in this context refers to an attack on a nuclear facility 
in war or by terrorists to release radioactive material into populated areas and 
the environment. Given these nuclear imperatives, this article will (1) review the 
uncontrollability of risks posed by both military and civilian nuclear systems, (2) 
describe the inadequacy of humanitarian responses to deal with nuclear risks, 
and (3) discuss the necessity of the “Ethical Empowerment” of civil society to 
reframe our arguments on nuclear issues in humanitarian terms and to make 
nuclear imperatives controllable and ultimately to resolve them.

